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readings of Paul still persist in the present 
volume, and demarcate a site of struggle 
between modern interpreters. On the one side 
of this struggle are those who use Paul’s 
letters and the postcolonial posture as ciphers 
for their own political engagements—
scholarship and political action melded 
together. Examples in the collection can be 
found in the emphasis on an “ethics of inter-
pretation” (p. 174), the plea to the “Christian 
Occident” to “renounce its complicity in the 
colonial and neo-colonial enterprise” (p. 222), 
and the “lessons that Christianity must learn 
from Marxism” (p. 50). For theologians and 
scholars of Paul in theological seminaries and 
divinity schools this politically interested 
approach is expected. On the other side of the 
struggle are scholars of religion in universities 
for whom this politically engaged approach is 
regarded as unacceptable, and considered 
symptomatic of a broader problem in the field 
of biblical studies, namely, theology masking 
as objective scholarship. A book review is not 
the place to adjudicate this issue, except to say 
that postcolonial criticism can be pulled in 
either direction: as another interpretive tool to 
mine Paul’s letters as historical data; or, as 
another interpretive tool to mine Paul’s letters 
for homiletic insights. The two are very 
different. 
 
David A. Kaden 
Department for the Study of Religion 
University of Toronto 
david.kaden@mail.utoronto.ca 
 
 
 
Existence and The Good: Metaphysical 
Necessity in Morals and Politics. Written by 
Franklin I. Gamwell. Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press, 2012. x + 209 pages. ISBN 
1438435924. $24.95 US, $24.95 CDN.  
 
Existence and the Good: Metaphysical 
Necessity in Morals and Politics, the latest 
book by University of Chicago Professor 
Emeritus Franklin I. Gamwell, reaffirms and 
enhances the process theologian’s reputation 
for analytic power and systematic clarity in 
service of democracy and human rights. The 
text—in many ways a comprehensive 
synthesis of Gamwell’s previous projects—
seeks to demonstrate that one cannot identify 
and justify the existence and nature of the 
human good, including the goods of human 
rights and democracy, without engaging in 
metaphysics.   
Gamwell commences by identifying and 
scrutinizing three foundational theories of 
morality that, on his reading, all fail to 
provide a rationally-warranted conception of 
the good: (1) liberal theories that uphold the 
existence of universal reason yet reject the 
possibility of metaphysical inquiry and thus 
the derivation of morality from the nature of 
existence itself; (2) classical metaphysical 
theories that uphold the possibility of deriving 
a principle of the good from the nature of 
reality as such, yet allow for the identification 
of the good by means of negation; and (3) 
post-modern theories that reject the possibility 
of universal reason altogether and, thus, the 
existence of a universal good at all. Gamwell 
sees Immanuel Kant as paradigmatically 
representing the first category, St. Thomas 
Aquinas the second, and Martin Heidegger the 
third.  
Gamwell builds his alternative to these 
theories atop the foundational insight that the 
claim “nothing exists” is logically absurd. To 
argue, for example, that we can only speak of 
the teleological good by means of negation—
as Aquinas seeks to do by establishing an 
analogical justification for the existence and 
nature of God—is rationally untenable. If one 
cannot say something positively univocal 
about the nature of the good, then, Gamwell 
argues, one is open to the charge either of 
articulating nonsense (akin, he says, to 
asserting the existence of a “colorless yellow 
rose”) or to claiming, implicitly, that “nothing 
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exists”—which, Gamwell maintains, is prag-
matically self-contradictory. Kant’s wholesale 
rejection of the possibility of metaphysical 
inquiry on the one hand, and Heidegger’s 
rejection of universal reason on the other, do 
not escape this critique, either: Gamwell seeks 
to demonstrate that both “Noumena” and 
“Dasein” are ultimately reducible to the same 
contradictory, rationally absurd assertion: 
“nothing exists.”  
Likewise, Gamwell argues that non-
teleological moral theories that seek to make-
up for the deficiencies of Kantian ethics by 
supplying substantive, positive content to the 
categorical imperative—like those advanced 
by Alan Gewirth, Jügen Habermas, and Karl-
Otto Apel—also fail to provide a rationally-
warranted foundation for morality because 
they commit what Gamwell calls the 
“partialistic fallacy”: in seeking to establish 
morality independently of any one, telic 
purpose, they end up, contradictorily, affirm-
ing the existence of one telic purpose: that all 
action ought seek to affirm the reality that 
there is no telic purpose, which, Gamwell 
argues, is a kind of telic purpose itself. 
In the wake of rejecting these 
alternatives, Gamwell moves to construct his 
own theoretical grounding for a rationally-
warranted conception of the good, which he 
identifies as “neo-classical metaphysics.” His 
position is “classical” in that it recognizes the 
necessity of metaphysics—and, in particular, 
theistic metaphysics—in order to make 
rationally justifiable claims about the exist-
ence and nature of the good, including the 
human good. It is “neo,” on the other hand, 
because it rejects the claim common in 
classical metaphysics that one can know the 
nature of the good by means of negation. In 
response, Gamwell seeks to identify positively 
and univocally the necessary constitutive 
features both of existence itself (what he calls 
“metaphysics in the strict sense”) and of 
subjectivity itself (what he calls “metaphysics 
in the broad sense”). Drawing deeply on the 
thought of Alfred North Whitehead and 
Charles Hartshorne, he devotes chapters 2 and 
3 to precisely, if densely at times, spelling out 
this metaphysical vision. This culminates in 
the demonstration of the existence of a being 
who, in the author’s words, is “an eminently 
temporal individual, who from everlasting to 
everlasting has existed and will exist as the 
ever-changing because of ever-increasing 
unifications of whatever has occurred in the 
world” (8).  
This divine being’s existence and nature, 
according to Gamwell, can be demon-strated 
by means of rational reflection alone; indeed, 
it is this divine being’s very temporality—the 
fact that it exists in time—that not only makes 
it accessible to human reason, but necessarily 
so: each rational person, Gamwell argues, has 
a constitutive awareness, at least implicitly, of 
the divine being’s existence and totality, 
which he calls an “original belief.”  It is this 
constitutive belief, in turn, that provides the 
conceptual grounds for pivoting from 
existence itself to the good itself, and in 
particular, the human good. By virtue of each 
person’s “original belief,” Gamwell contends, 
one not only necessarily knows the consti-
tutive nature of existence, but also necessarily 
knows it as teleological, and in particular, as 
“the concrete realization of unity in diversity” 
(11). One knows, in other words, that exist-
ence properly understood constitutes the good, 
and it is this constitutive knowledge, in turn, 
that generates the human capacity not only to 
make choices, but to be able to make moral 
choices—that is, to choose to act in accord-
ance with the comprehensive good that one 
cannot fail to know, or to choose against it.   
From and within this metaphysical and 
teleological framework, Gamwell then moves 
swiftly but deftly in chapter 4 to elaborating 
on this conception of moral freedom and 
responsibility, which, in turn, he leverages and 
refines to demonstrate the existence of what 
he calls “social practices.” These practices, 
authorized by and derived from the 
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teleological nature of the good, include the 
foundational principle of “communicative 
respect,” by which Gamwell means the recog-
nition that any claim a subject makes to moral 
validity—that is, any statement an individual 
makes to explain and justify her actions—
implicitly and necessarily affirms the right for 
any other subject to contest it and make her 
own claims to moral validity. This principle, 
Gamwell emphasizes, is implicitly rooted in 
the nature of the good but explicitly morally 
neutral to competing moral visions. It does, 
nevertheless, establish the grounds for basic 
human rights.  
The principle of communicative respect 
also provides the foundation for a 
constitutional principle of authentic religious 
freedom, according to Gamwell. And it is 
here, in the final chapters of the book, where 
he moves from discussing social practices 
more generally to the justification of democr-
acy more specifically, and in particular, the 
possibility of a genuinely religiously neutral 
constitution. In an extended and generously-
argued conversation with Jeffrey Stout’s 
Democracy and Tradition, Gamwell 
highlights the strengths of Stout’s critiques of 
what he calls “liberalism” and “the new 
traditionalism,” defined, respect-ively, as the 
claim that comprehensive visions of the good 
do not belong in public discourse at all 
(“liberalism”), and as the competing claim 
that religiously neutral discourse is impossible 
because universal moral reason is a fiction 
(the “new traditionalism”). Yet, not 
surprisingly, Gamwell ultimately disagrees 
with Stout’s contention that the solution to the 
standoff is to engage in what Stout calls 
“ethics without metaphysics.” One of the 
foundational insights Gamwell seeks to 
advance in the book is that we cannot, 
rationally speaking, cleave the former from 
the latter. Happily, however, the metaphysical 
reality Gamwell describes, and the nature of 
the good he locates within and derives from it 
includes the recognition of a rationally-
warranted principal of religious neutrality, 
thus solving the problem that Stout, in 
Gamwell’s mind, aptly describes but fails to 
redress. 
Encapsulating Existence and the Good is 
uniquely hazardous because Gamwell’s 
systematic argument, like the metaphysical 
system he so carefully describes, is 
meticulously and syllogistically disciplined at 
every step, and so defies generalization. Yet 
even in summary form it is clear that the 
project makes an essential contribution to 
contemporary moral theory, both in general 
and in relation to the more specific issues of 
human rights and the possibility of religiously 
neutral democratic discourse. Even if one does 
not finish the book convinced of the rationally 
demonstrable existence of an all-encompass-
ing temporal being who grows in ever-
increasing actuality, perhaps the text’s great-
est strength is its capacity to illuminate the 
rational weaknesses of alternative moral para-
digms with unassuming but devastating 
precision. Indeed, given that most contempor-
ary ethicists—including both Rawlsian “lib-
erals” and MacIntyrean “traditionalists”—still 
appear to agree that Immanuel Kant has had 
the final word on the validity of metaphysical 
inquiry in general and metaphysical ethical 
inquiry more specifically, Gamwell’s work 
brilliantly provides a much-needed rejoinder. 
Perhaps metaphysics is not dead after all.   
 
Matthew R. Petrusek 
The University of Chicago Divinity School 
petrusek@uchicago.edu 
 
